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This trilogy represents a high-water mark for comparative philosophy of religion. 
 
The basic premise of the project is simple: it brings tradition specialists 
in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese Religions 
together with generalists interested in comparing religious ideas. The specialists 
spell out how the six traditions understand the nature of ultimate realities, 
the human condition, and religious truth. Then the generalists, Robert Neville 
and Wesley Wildman, gather that work and draw out similarities and differences. 
This is a very self-reflective work, replete with meta-discussions of 
method, appendices on the experience of working on the project, and annotated 
bibliographies, a second-order apparatus that is very valuable – or not – 
depending on the reader’s interests. In the first place, though, these books are 
worthy of note simply because in an age of skepticism about cross-cultural 
comparisons, they go out in a workmanlike style and do it. As Peter Berger 
notes in a foreword, in a time when particularism dominates the study of 
religions and religions are treated as Leibnizian monads impenetrable by 
generalizing concepts, the very existence of these books stands as a challenge 
to postmodern epistemological assumptions (The Human Condition, xiii). 
 
The volumes have two goals. The first is to make the comparisons between 
ideas of these six religions; the second is to present and to test Neville’s theory 
of comparison. On this theory, comparing is properly a three-stage process. 
First, the comparativist must formulate a vague category as the respect in 
which disparate things are compared. All categories will emerge from some 
historical and cultural context, so they need to be abstracted and made vague 
enough not to privilege any of the entities that fall within them. Second, 
because the category is so generic, it does not suffice simply to apply it to 
what is being compared. One must also show how adherents of the various 
religions specify the category. And then, third, the specifications need to be 
translated into the language of the comparative category. In this way, the 
language of the vague category becomes enriched by the distinctions in the 
various specifications. Neville’s theory reflects Charles Peirce’s semiotics, but 
it is presented in a straightforward and jargon-free style, and it too stands as 
a challenge to those who argue that comparison is always biased. 
 
A product of Boston University’s multiyear, interdisciplinary ‘Comparative 
Religious Ideas Project,’ this trilogy invites comparison to the multiyear, 
interdisciplinary project at the University of Chicago Divinity School 
that produced three anthologies in the series ‘Toward a Comparative Philosophy 
of Religions’ (Frank E. Reynolds and David Tracy (eds.), Myth and 
Philosophy [SUNY, 1990]; Discourse and Practice [SUNY, 1992]; and Religion 
and Practical Reason [SUNY, 1994]). The Chicago books also brought 
tradition specialists together with philosophers of religion to advance comparative 
projects. But the Chicago editors did not ask their authors to address 
specific questions and therefore those volumes are diffuse (to put it kindly), 
pairing papers with disparate methods and subject matters together post 
hoc under arbitrary rubrics like ‘Practice.’ In these books, by contrast, the 
authors are required to speak to the three philosophical categories, and though 
the appendices report that they sometimes chafed, it is also true that they 
produced a focused and hence useful exploration of the teachings of these 
six religions on these three topics. In fact, one might see this project as 
taking Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion and turning it into a Lakatosstyle 
research program. Geertz famously defines religion as a way of life that 
embodies a conception of the general order of existence or a worldview. These 
books unpack Geertz’s idea of a religious worldview as the three themes 
represented in the titles. They replace Geertz with an interdisciplinary team. 
And instead of defining religion in a stipulated way, they make a series of 
interpretations that they present as vulnerable and open to correction. 
 
The individual essays that make up the body of the three volumes can be 
read in two ways. On the one hand, they can be read as accounts by specialists 
of what the six traditions teach about the three categories, and then comparative 
summaries by generalists. On this reading, the books represent a nice 
bit of interdisciplinary teamwork and a valuable resource for scholars wanting 
a handy account of, for instance, Jewish ideas of religious truth or Chinese 
ideas of the human condition. This is how the volumes present themselves. 
 
On the other hand, the books can also be read as an exercise in which 
Neville has a special role, not unlike a rider trying to coax skittish animals 
into a pen. On this reading, the volumes display much more struggle. First, 
a general category is proposed and subcategories are suggested. Then, each 
of the tradition specialists, in an exercise that involves an enormous amount 
of creativity and insight, selects a text or small set of texts and puts it in 
conversation with those categories. Sometimes the categories and the selected 
texts ‘click,’ but sometimes there is only a partial match. And sometimes the 
tradition specialist doesn’t want to play at all. 
 
Here is an example. The volume on ultimate reality distinguishes between 
what is ultimate in an ontological sense and what is ultimate in an anthropological 
sense. What is ultimate in the ontological sense is that aspect of 
reality the religion considers greatest; what is ultimate in the anthropological 
sense is that aspect of a person’s life that the religion makes central, her 
or his ultimate concern. In this way Neville specifies the general category 
of ultimacy in two subcategories. But in the section on Chinese religions, 
Livia Kohn and James Miller hold that the Chinese have no proper terms to 
translate these ideas. Creating terms to express them produces neologisms 
that are ‘absurd’ and ‘senseless,’ and they quote several scholars who say that 
western interpreters who seek an ultimate reality in Chinese religions distort 
them (11–14). They suggest that even the anthropological sense of ultimacy 
is not relevant in this context because, ‘unlike other religions, the Chinese 
acknowledge that, beyond the most vague descriptions of such experiences as 
a sense of harmony or transcendence, they are utterly personal and subjective’ 
(13). Faced with this recalcitrance, Neville has to object, and he does. He 
argues that by suggesting that the Chinese religious ideal is utterly subjective 
and not a universal ultimate in the anthropological sense, Kohn and Miller 
are themselves misrepresenting the Chinese materials (156–158). ‘Would 
they agree that some categories for harmony and transcendence for instance, 
getting richer than anyone else, are materially foolish? Is not the Dao the only 
way to transcendence and harmony?’ And granted that the Chinese religions 
do not speak of an ultimate as a static substance, the Chinese texts cannot 
speak of living in accord with the Dao, unless the Dao is an ultimate reality 
in the ontological sense as well. 
 
I call attention to this internal struggle not to impugn the books but to 
underscore how much hermeneutic skill is involved in comparing religious 
ideas, and that this skill is present in these volumes. It is not a question of a 
cookie cutter approach. (It seems to me also that this would be a good way to 
ask a class to read these essays.) The end result, then, is a comparison of the 
three ideas in the six religions that is valuable because it is so carefully done. 
